FIXING MECHANISMS AND LEGAL COVERAGE 3.2.1 Recent policy changes in minimum wage fixing
The minimum wage system in the period 1998-2008 relied on the Collective Agreement on the Lowest Wage, which was signed by the government, major trade union associations and a minor employers' association in March 1998. The Collective Agreement was immediately extended to cover all employers and employees in Croatia by Decree of the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare. As stipulated by the Agreement, the lowest gross wage paid to a fulltime worker cannot be lower than the minimum base for paying social security contributions.) The minimum contribution base itself is determined by the Minister of Finance. Until 2003, determination of this base was at the Minister's discretion, but since then it has been indexed to 35 per cent of the national average gross wage in the period from January to August of the previous year, as determined by the Law on Social Security Contributions. The amount of the minimum contribution base -that is, the minimum wage -was set at the end of the calendar year and was valid for the following year. It applied to full-time workers, as well as part-time workers in proportion to the number of hours worked without differentiation in terms of experience, age, sector or region. Although one might think of the 1998 legislation as being more concerned with minimum social security contributions rather than with partners, signalling a strengthening of social dialogue. It seems, however, that there were no predetermined criteria behind this decision. The new minimum wage level was set higher than under the previous system as a compromise between the trade unions' pressure to increase the MW/AW ratio to 50 per cent in the medium term and employers' warnings about the possible negative employment consequences of any substantial increase in this ratio. International comparisons, revealing Croatia's position as a country with one of the lowest MW I A W ratios, served as the benchmark for the decision on the new level.
However, the uprating formula is unique and rather confusing. It reflects a willingness to ensure continuous adjustment of the minimum wage level by taking into account economic conditions. However, the formula could lead to a sizeable increase in the minimum wage over a relatively short period. Indexation and the uprating formula reveal that the social partners prefer the minimum wage level to be fixed by law rather than by negotiations or other means. This may reflect a high degree of mistrust among the social partners. The actual minimum wage is not differentiated by experience, age or region. However, the Minimum Wage Act 2008 stipulates some differentiation by sector. For workers in the labour-intensive textile, wood processing and leather industries the minimum wage is set at 94 per cent of the national minimum wage in the first year, 96 per cent in the second year, 97 per cent in the third year and 98 per cent in the fourth year of implementation of the new law.
The Minimum Wage Act 2008 raises some seriously controversial issues. The trade union in the textile, footwear, leather and rubber industries has challenged this Act in the Constitutional Court, arguing that it is discriminatory, in that it discriminates between workers according to sector of employment. The Court was expected to reach a decision in 2008, but nothing has yet happened (mid-2009) . The other problem is that the Act is not sufficiently precise on several important issues. The coverage of exempted sectors is unclear, since it fails to reflect official statistical classifications. As an example, the industry with the lowest wage in Croatia is clothing, but it was not explicitly mentioned in the Act as an industry that was permitted to pay a subminimum wage, presumably on the assumption that the textile industry also covers clothing; in fact this is not the case in statistical classification. It seems that the Minimum Wage Act 2008 was enacted with undue haste. The social partners agreed on the major components of the draft on 7 May 2008, and the Act passed the parliamentary procedure in less than one month, coming into force from I July 2008. Since it entails a substantial rise in the minimum wage mid-year, with very little forewarning, the question is how employers in low-wage sectors will be able to cope with such an unexpected increase. The ever-rising MW/AW ratio is also a contentious issue. The proportion of full-time employees earning the minimum wage in Croatia has been relatively stable since its introduction in 1998. It is estimated to be between 3 and 5 per cent -the limited statistical data on wage distribution preclude a more precise estimate. Establishment survey data on the employment structure by wage level are reported in accordance with 13 wage brackets (CBS 2008) . These statistics take into account the take-home wage (net of taxes and social security contributions) for full-time workers, precluding a direct comparison with the minimum wage, which is set in gross terms. Also, the upper bound of the lowest income bracket is higher than the minimum wage recalculated in net terms. In 2007, 5 per cent of employees had a net wage below Croatian kuna (HRK) 1,900 (€259), while the minimum wage in net terms amounted to between HRK 1,800 (€245) and HRK 1,840 (€251), depending on the amount of personal income tax paid. The Labour Force Surveys (LFS) provide another source of information on the coverage of the minimum wage, although they were not used for the compilation of official wage statistics. Our own estimates based on the 1998 and 2005 LFS show that approximately 3 per cent of full-time employees received wages in an amount equal to or lower than the minimum wage.
Figures on the coverage of the minimum wage include a certain proportion of "disguised" minimum wage earners, that is, those paid by a combination of the registered minimum wage and unregistered cash supplements ("envelope" wages). The incidence of this practice in Croatia has not been directly examined in the literature, although estimates of the "underground" economy suggest that it might be significant among the self-employed and workers in small enterprises, especially in construction, hotels and restaurants, retail, business services and personal services (Lovrincevic et al. 2006) .
The increase in the minimum wage level achieved in July 2008 is intended to raise the coverage of minimum wage earners. In the proposal of the Minimum Wage Act to the Parliament, the government estimated that 7.6 per cent of employees would be paid the minimum wage following the introduction of the Act (Government of the Republic of Croatia 2008), a substantial increase in coverage in comparison with previous minimum wage setting.
MINIMUM WAGE DEVELOPMENTS

Minimum wage level
At the beginning of 2008, the minimum wage was HRK 2441 per month in gross terms, equivalent to €336 (Table 3 .1). The amount of the minimum wage has risen steadily since 1998, except in 2001 when it stagnated. The ratio between the minimum wage (MW) and the economy-wide average wage (AW) has remained stable at around 33 per cent throughout the period since its introduction in 1998.
Application of the new law in mid-2008 raised the minimum wage to HRK 2,747, or approximately €380, almost 20 per cent higher than the previous year. The minimum wage at the end of2008 reached 36.4 per cent of the average wage, an increase of around 4 percentage points over 2007.
The absolute level of the minimum wage in Croatia is the second highest in . Central and Eastern Europe, just behind that in Slovenia, as reported in Chapter 1. At the same time, the MW / A W ratio is one of the lowest in the region. This dichotomy generates conflicting views among the social partners concerning the minimum wage level. The total number of employees on the minimum wage is estimated at around 50,000 -one-tenth of the number of retirees. At that level, the minimum wage cannot contribute much to reducing overall poverty in Croatia. According to CBS (2007a) , the poverty threshold at 60 per cent of median income in 2006 was HRK 1,744 per month (net) for a single person, which was roughly the amount of the minimum wage at that time, expressed in net terms. This relative poverty line is considered in policy discussions, but it is not linked to social transfers or social assistance. Social benefits are generally at levels well below the minimum wage.
Two trade union associations, the Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia and the Independent Croatian Trade Union, regularly publish the "trade union minimum basket" value as an indicative poverty line. Each basket is estimated for a four-person family. Recalculated for a single person by using the OECD equivalence scale, both yielded a value of more than HRK 2,700 per month in 2007, which is a relatively high threshold, around 50 per cent above the minimum wage level of that time and close to 60 per cent of the average net wage.
The composition of minimum wage earners reveals certain vulnerable groups of workers. Minimum wage earners in Croatia are more often women, young people, those with a low level of educational attainment (primary school or below) and employees with fixed-term contracts (Table 3 .2). A higher incidence of minimum wage earners is found in small enterprises and within the private sector. The minimum wage is an important instrument for the purpose of protecting employees in these vulnerable groups from further erosion of their living standards. It appears that the government is a good employer for low-wage workers; there are virtually no employees on the minimum wage in the public sector.
Examination of minimum wage coverage by sector suggests that workers in textiles, clothing, leather and wood processing are at the greatest risk of being low-paid, having the highest proportion of minimum wage earners, with more than 10 per cent of workers received the minimum wage in 2007. Other low-paying industries include furniture, construction and retail, with minimum wage coverage of 5-10 per cent. The same low-paying sectors can be identified by looking at the national minimum wage expressed as a proportion of the sectoral average wage (Figure 3. 3). The two sectors with the lowest wages are clothing and leather, in which the minimum wage stood at around 7.0 two-thirds of the average wage. However, the clothing industry seems to be in a worse position because its average wage has been declining relative to the national minimum wage since 2000. We estimate that between one-quarter and one-third of all employees in the clothing industry will be paid the minimum wage under the new legislation.
An increase in the minimum wage in July 2008 will surely have beneficial effects on the low paid and the working poor, although the extent of this remains to be seen when the statistical information becomes available.
Danijel Nestic -9781781000571 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/30/2019 12:09:51PM via free access
,.
-- Source: Author's estimates based on CBS data.
Effects on wage disparities 95
The minimum wage could be a balancing mechanism in the case of an unacceptable evolution of wage differentials between vulnerable and more advantaged groups of employees. Despite the limited information on the wage structure, it seems that wage differentials have been increasing in Croatia during the past ten years. The wage decile ratio D91D 1 increased modestly, from 2.7 in 1998 to 3.0 in 2005 (Table 3. 3). Wage differentials by age, skills, size of enterprise and type of contract also widened between 1998 and 2005. The relative position of younger and less-skilled workers, fixed-term contract holders, those in smaller enterprises and those in the private sector deteriorated. Although it seems that the minimum wage did not influence the observed evolution due to a stable MvV/AW ratio throughout the period under examination and a relatively low coverage, it is possible that wage differentials would have been even more pronounced without the minimum wage. Also, the 2008 increase in the minimum wage level is expected to lead to a reduction in wage disparities that may be revealed in future statistics. As for taxation, minimum wage earners in Croatia are obliged to pay flatrate social security contributions (20 per cent of the gross wage) and sometimes also personal income tax (PIT), depending on family circumstances. As in 2007, minimum wage earners without dependents had to pay PIT in the amount of around 1.6 per cent of the minimum wage. Any increase in the minimum wage could have beneficial effects on Government revenues and help to reduce the practice of envelope payments. The fiscal function of the minimum wage should therefore also be taken into account (see Chapter 1).
Effects on employment
The effects of the minimum wage on employment have not, as far as we know, been examined in research papers in Croatia. Bearing in mind the stability of the MW/AW ratio and the relatively low coverage of minimum wage earners, one could expect the minimum wage to have had a limited impact on employment. In other words, employment trends were much more driven by other factors.
Following substantial hikes in the late 1990s, the rate of increase in the average wage substantially moderated in the early 2000s, coinciding with the change in employment trends. After a decade of declining employment in the 1990s, employment began to rise in 2001, increasing by 11 per cent by 2007. Moderation of overall wage dynamics may have been a factor in the recovery of employment. However, the employment rise took place also in a situation of relatively high economic growth of around 4.5 per cent per annum, unfavourable demographic trends -including an ageing workforce and a declining working-age population -a relatively high unemployment rate and a significant structural mismatch between labour demand and supply. Some sectors, such as construction, hotels and restaurants and shipbuilding, face serious shortages not only of skilled production workers, but also of unskilled workers, despite offering wages well above the minimum wage, and even above the average wage. Employers are increasingly pressing the government to increase the number of work permits for immigrant workers (Obadic 2008) .
It is puzzling to experience a high registered unemployment rate -of 14.8 per cent and a survey-based ILO-defined unemployment rate of 9.6 per cent (both 2007 figures) -in conjunction with strong demand for bluecollar workers in particular sectors. The sectoral, regional and occupational mobility of Croatian workers is obviously low and the labour force has a strong preference for white-collar jobs. From that perspective, the minimum wage is not the most pressing issue for employers in general, although it could notably influence employment changes in some branches. If the labour market manages to increase labour mobility, the recent increase in the minimum wage could speed up structural changes in the economy by moving workers from declining, low value-added industries to high value-added and expanding industries. The case study findings on the clothing industry presented in Section 3.5 suggest that such a response to a rising minimum wage can be expected.
Effects on collective bargaining
The collective bargaining process has been a new experience for the social partners in Croatia due to the heritage of the socialist economy with its completely different mindset and habits in regulating employment relations. The social dialogue in the environment of a market economy has involved a learning process for both trade unions and employers. The first important advances came in the second half of the 1990s when employers' associations developed sufficient solidarity and influence to participate in the social dialogue as an active partner.
The minimum wage system during the period 1998-2008 might have boosted the development of collective bargaining because the level of the The agreement among the social partners and the government on the new minimum wage legislation can also be seen as an initial step in high-level talks concerning other issues of common interest. The government is highly interested in concluding a wider-reaching agreement on economic and social policy (the Social Pact) in a situation of increasing inflation and rising dissatisfaction with slow real wage growth. Employers would also like to sign a Social Pact, while the trade unions are more cautious, since they do not currently see any substantial benefits in concluding such an agreement, although they are willing to participate in social dialogue. Despite the nominal interest of all parties, bringing the Social Pact to a satisfactory conclusion may prove difficult. The minimum wage could have been an important component in the negotiations about the Pact; however, its recent regulation may have removed a vital incentive for further negotiation between social partners. A statutory minimum wage could, therefore, have an ongoing impact on social dialogue. However, company-level collective bargaining should not be affected by the new minimum wage regulation as opportunities still exist to determine wages and a number of other working conditions through the bargaining process.
3. This result should be viewed with caution because the presented data are not fully representative. A number of collective agreements are not recorded at the Ministry, mostly agreements in small and medium-sized companies that operate on local markets and that are not obliged to report on their agreements to the Ministry. In any case, the suggested stagnation in the process in 2006-07 could not have been linked to the minimum wage because there were no changes in the minimum wage system at that time.
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Effects on the three EU mobilities
Interaction between wages and mobility of goods, labour and capital in Croatia is influenced more by the effects of the average wage level on mobility than by the minimum wage per se. As already mentioned, the average wage level in Croatia is the second highest among transition economies, and higher than merited by its GDP per capita. This may affect foreign direct investment (FDI) and migration flows, as well as the overall competitiveness of the economy.
Minimum wage and foreign direct investment Although the attractiveness of a country for FDI depends on many factors, Croatia's relatively high wage level may have been a deterrent factor. Sohinger and Horvatin (2005) found that high labour costs were the main reason why foreign capital in Croatia mainly targeted the service sector (banking, insurance, telecommunications and retail trade), which is oriented towards the domestic market, rather than manufacturing, which is more oriented towards international markets. The National Competitiveness Council (2007) also recognizes that a high wage level relative to productivity is an issue for Croatia's competitiveness. However, we are not aware of any study that points to the minimum wage regulation in Croatia as having a detrimental effect on FDI, which is not unexpected due to the low MW / A W ratio. However, in particular sectors, such as clothing and textiles, foreign investors may be deterred by the rising minimum wage stipulated in the new legislation.
Minimum wage and labour mobility Wage disparities between the host and the country of origin influence labour mobility. Because wage differences between Western European countries and Croatia are not striking for the most competitive occupations, incentives for outward labour migration are limited. However, Croatia is sufficiently attractive for inward migration from neighbouring countries. In recent years, migration flows have stabilized. In 2006, Croatia experienced a net inward migration of around 7300 persons, with around 15,000 immigrants and 7,700 emigrants. The majority of immigrants came from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, most of them ethnic Croats. These two countries also dominate outward migration, suggesting that non-economic reasons for migration related to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia are still influential. However, economic reasons should not be disregarded. The minimum wage level is far from sufficient to prevent outward migration of labour, although it might be attractive enough for workers from other low-income countries in the region. The Croatian authorities issue only a small number of work permits for foreigners despite rising requests from employers, especially in the construction industry, where the shortage of domestic labour is most evident. Construction is a booming sector characterized by a high degree of competition; average wages are below the national average, coupled with aboveaverage minimum wage coverage. Strong demand for construction work along with rising private and public investments have increased demand for highlyskilled workers, while employers are more frequently looking for such workers in other countries. Recent changes in the minimum wage regulation and the hike in the minimum wage level could increase the attractiveness of certain jobs for local workers, but this may not have any substantial effects for most of the sectors disdained by local workers and in which employers are trying to fill vacancies with either local or migrant workers; unattractive working conditions are more of an issue. As confirmation, during discussions on the new legislation, the minimum wage was not considered to have the function of protecting the wages of local workers from the downward pressure exerted by an influx of migrant workers.
Minimum wage and trade (mobility of goods and services)
The lifting of all barriers on goods and services within the EU is creating new trade opportunities but also imposing more competitive pressures on labour. In Croatia, the link between competitiveness and wages is controversial. Employers believe that the relatively high wages in absolute terms exert strong pressure on the competitiveness of domestic enterprises, which was the main reason behind the merely moderate wage increases in the 2000s, as compared to the substantial wage hikes recorded at the end of the 1990s. However, the trade unions warn that a higher average wage is needed due to the relatively high general cost of living in Croatia in order to maintain the purchasing power of wages at an adequate level. Their position is that an increase in wages, particularly in the level of the minimum wage, will not endanger competitiveness but will, in fact, lead to higher productivity by increasing the efforts of workers and managers.
The National Competitiveness Council (2007) warns that the competitiveness of Croatian companies still depends to too great an extent on costs rather than on technological advances in products and the production process. However, competitiveness is recognized as a multidimensional phenomenon with a number of factors contributing to the relatively weak competitiveness of Croatian companies, as suggested by the relatively, slow pace of export growth, wide trade deficit (merchandise imports twice as high as merchandise exports), and a history of persistent current account deficits of around 7-8 per cent of GDP. An unemployment rate of around 16 per cent in 2006 (administrative sources, not ILO-definition) could also be seen as part of the problem. However, studies on competitiveness highlight the overall wage level, rather than the minimum wage level, as being problematic. Therefore, the National Competitiveness Council (2004) extended to all employees in the enterprise, while sector-level collective agreements in the largest branches are extended by administrative decision of the relevant minister. The recent change in the minimum wage legislation from the extended National Collective Agreement to the Minimum Wage Act 2008 was motivated by shortcomings in the collective bargaining process. Therefore, we held interviews with several high-ranking trade unions' and employers' association representatives on the major issues related to the possible impact of the new minimum wage legislation on collective bargaining.
The minimum wage to respond to collective bargaining shortcomings Employer and trade union representatives consider that the collective bargaining process in Croatia has been making progress and that there is rising interest in participation in social dialogue, especially at the enterprise level. However, the trade union representatives highlight the weak bargaining system at branch/sectoral level. Problems with sectoral dialogue are seen in the low density of employers' associations and the unwillingness of branch/ sectoral employers' associations to participate in sectoral agreements. The employers' association representatives confirm that they are, for the most part, unwilling to conclude sectoral agreements, for two reasons: (a) sectoral agreements are of limited effectiveness since most employers that might be covered by such agreements also negotiate enterprise-level agreements and are unwilling to repeat the process; and (b) sectoral agreements do not guarantee equal conditions for all employers in the sector due to non-compliance and ineffective sanctions for violation of rules.
The trade union representatives argue that collective agreements in Croatia cannot protect the wages of the most vulnerable workers. Two arguments are presented: (i) inability to ensure effective application of collective agreements to all workers; and (ii) inability to increase the lowest wage through the sectoral collective agreements. As to the first argument, they mention that despite obvious violations of collective agreements in some companies in the private sector, such cases are not reported due to fear of reprisals in the form of layoffs. The subject of court disputes over collective agreements is not normally the minimum wage rate -that is, the lowest base wage set in collective agreements -but, rather, other aspects of compensation, most frequently of those employed in the public sector. A problem with the lowest base wage arises when wages are not paid at all, which is the case when an enterprise faces serious liquidity problems or is in danger of becoming bankrupt. The second argument on the lowest base wage agreed in sectoral collective agreements in the private sector merits further elaboration. Sectoral collective agreements: the starting wage set below the national minimum wage In agriculture, industry and services there were eight sectoral collective agreements in place at the beginning of 2008. These agreements usually set the whole range of provisions for workers, such as bonuses for working conditions, overtime and holiday payments, incentive measures, and so on. For six agreements, the application has been extended to the whole sector by an administrative decision of the relevant ministry (Table 3 .4). The lowest base wage in sectoral collective agreements is usually defined as the minimum rate for work in the simplest and least demanding jobs, paid for regular work and standard performance over a month. Intriguingly, the lowest wage in six sectoral collective agreements was set below the national minimum wage (Table 3 .4). Some of these collective agreements were concluded several years ago, but even at the time of conclusion they were close to or in certain cases below the national minimum. In the case of construction, the lowest basic wage is set to be equal to the national minimum wage valid up to July 2008. The collective agreement for hotels and restaurants fixed the starting wage at 36 per cent of the average wage, slightly above the old national minimum wage, but below the new minimum wage level.
How is it possible that collective agreements set the lowest wage rate below the national minimum? At least three explanations are valid. First, and most importantly, according to the Labour Code, workers' rights are applied on the basis of the legal act that is most beneficial for them. In other words, the national minimum wage is applied in all cases where a worker would otherwise receive a wage below it, even if the wage is determined fully in accordance with the collective agreement. Second, the lowest base wage is either entirely or partially a reference for the calculation of wages for jobs with a higher degree of complexity, using certain coefficients. Pay scales -that is, coefficients -are an integral part of all but one of the collective agreements reviewed. In that way, collective agreements set the base wage for all workers. For employers, it is important to keep the lowest base wage relatively low, even below the national minimum wage, to escape automatic uprating of wages for highly skilled workers. Third, collective agreements define numerous allowances, bonuses and other payments that should be made in addition to the basic wage. Total compensation and benefits from collective agreements could then be acceptable for workers, even if the lowest base wage is set below the national minimum wage. In conclusion, sectoral collective agreements provide wages that are above the minimum wage level, but in a complicated and far from transparent way. to the collective bargaining shortcomings such as those detailed above, but how will it influence collective bargaining in future? Union representatives are aware that this Act could weaken incentives for collective bargaining but believe in continued improvement of the process in the future since they perceive significant room for bargaining on other issues at all levels, from enterprise to national level. However, the increase in the national minimum wage further increased· the gap with collectively agreed starting wages at sectoral level. More wage bargaining, not less, is therefore needed at enterprise level.
The employers' representatives held that a national collective agreement would be the best framework for setting the wage threshold, but the situation has now changed with the new Act.
We initiated talks on the general national collective agreement that would include guidelines for overall wage policy, Now, after the minimum wage has been regulated by the law, further talks on the conclusion of such a general collective agreement are of much less interest for both sides.
Nevertheless, both trade union and employers' association representatives agreed -and this consensus is worth noting -that enterprise-level collective bargaining should not be affected by the change in the minimum wage regulation or an increase in the minimum wage level. They also agree that the Minimum Wage Act should be seen as a complement to and not a substitute for collective bargaining.
Case study 2: Minimum wages in the clothing industry's struggle for survival -a concrete example
A declining, export-oriented and low-wage industry The relatively high wage level in Croatia compared to competitors from Central and Eastern Europe, coupled with relatively low productivity, is seen as one of the major competitiveness issues in the country. The clothing industry has had increasing difficulties in coping with the prevailing wage level. The average wage in the clothing industry was 71 per cent of the economywide average wage in 1997 and fell below 49 per cent of the average ten years later. The sensitivity of this branch to the new minimum wage regulations is thus easily understood. A few indicators illustrate the declining trend in the clothing industry. In the past ten years, employment decreased by 39 per cent, from 31,800 employees in 1997 to 19,400 in 2007, when it accounted for 7.9 per cent of industrial employment and 1.6 per cent of total corporate employment. In 2006, there were 481 companies in the branch, 99 per cent in private ownership, about one-third of which reported losses (Croatian Chamber of Economy 2007). In 2005, the gross value added in clothing made up 0.8 per cent of the total gross value added in the economy and around 4 per cent of that in manufacturing industry. The clothing industry is still an important exporter, although while exports of apparel made up 12.2 per cent of total exports in 1997, they had fallen to 3.3 per cent by 2007. The total value of exports in this sector has fallen by 30 per cent in the past ten years. Around 80 per cent of production is for export, mostly within the framework of subcontracting arrangements (socalled lohn contracts), where foreign customers provide designs and materials, while local enterprises provide labour and organize manufacturing. In such contracts, labour costs are particularly important for profitability, accounting for around two-thirds of the contract value.
The clothing industry pays low wages, often at a level close to the minimum wage, as suggested by wage distribution data. In March 2007, around 50 per cent of workers received wages below 120 per cent of the minimum wage level, while around 25 per cent of workers received wages below 105 per cent of the minimum wage (CBS, 2008) . The Minimum Wage Act, in force from July 2008, has caused a substantial rise in the minimum wage level. The clothing industry, however, has four years in which to adjust fully to the new minimum wage level. In the second half of 2008, the minimum wage that applies to the clothing industry is 94 per cent of the national minimum wage (HRK 2,583), 12.4 per cent more than in 2007. Between onequarter and one-third of workers in the branch will be covered by the new minimum wage.
In order to describe the s.ituation in terms of competitiveness and the minimum wage in the clothing industry, we carried out a company case study. We chose a medium-sized company that is representative of the situation in Croatia and in which minimum wage regulation is important. We conducted interviews with the director and a small number of workers.
Rising costs pushing a women's ready-to-wear company to diversify The company was established in 1956 and manufactures light women's readyto-wear garments such as skirts, trousers, shirts, blouses and jackets. It is situated in a small city in north-western Croatia. The company was privatized in the early 1990s. A limited liability company holds 75 per cent of shares, while there are around 800 small shareholders, mostly former and current employees, owning around 15 per cent of the company. The director holds 10 per cent of the company shares, which are not listed on the stock exchange. After being profitable at the beginning of the 2000s, the company has reported modest losses in the past few years. The market value of the company's assets is significant because it owns a large parcel of land in a nearby industrial zone, two spacious workshops built in the 1980s and several shops.
The company employs 245 workers, only five of whom are men. Approximately 70 per cent of production is for export, mainly within the Danijel Nestic -9781781000571 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/30/2019 12:09:51PM via free access framework of lohn contracts with partners from Germany and Italy. The proportion of production for lohn contracts (subcontracting) has intentionally been downsized in the past couple of years due to the low profitability of such arrangements, and even losses in some cases. The director told us:
Prices in fohn contracts are more or less given and we could only negotiate in terms of a [euro] cent up or down, while the costs of production are rising. However, there is increasing interest in boutique fashion production, that is, more demanding small series of 20-30 pieces, which leave a bit more room for bargaining over price and we are gradually moving over to such production. The company has also developed several of its own brands that are sold on the domestic market, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia with the intention of gradually strengthening this part of production.
The company pays relatively low wages; however, they are paid on a regular basis and at the level prevailing in the clothing industry. Workers' wages are based on a piece-work incentive system, with a defined norm -that is, expected performance. One in five production workers is paid the minimum wage. At the beginning of 2008, the Collective Agreement for the Company was concluded. The Agreement defines wages and compensation to workers, as well as other issues important for both sides. In full-time equivalent terms, and provided that the set norm is attained, the lowest base wage per month was set marginally above the national minimum wage for the first half of 2008. Two issues are intriguing: (i) the co-existence of the minimum wage and piece-work payments; and (ii) adjustment to the rising minimum wage.
Problems in combining minimum wage and piece rates Management reported that the minimum wage in combination with the piecework system had a significant disincentive effect within the company. According to the director:
When a worker meets the norm, she will be paid well above the minimum wage. However, when a worker performs considerably below the norm, her wage could drop below the minimum wage and the company has to pay a wage supplement to such workers up to the minimum. For some workers, the supplement makes up 30 per cent of the wage. In the end, a highly productive worker could receive a take-home wage only slightly above that of a low-producing worker . ... Such a situation is highly detrimental for motivation and productivity, and leads to dissatisfaction.
There is also the risk of moral hazard when workers realize that, for various reasons, they will not be able to reach a satisfactory level of production over the course of a month, as a consequence of which they will work as little as possible and rely on the minimum wage. the number of low-paid workers led to a more active minimum wage policy based on the Minimum Wage Act in July 2008. At present, from the most recent statistical data we can make an initial assessment concerning the effects of the 2008 minimum wage hike, or future changes in the minimum wage level in line with the new legislation. It seems to be clear that the new regulation has led to an increase in the minimum wage to average wage ratio. It has also led to a one-off increase in the number of minimum wage recipients. A positive eff~ct is also expected on the standard of living of low-paid workers. Furthermore, wage disparities could be lowered as a result of a rising minimum wage level.
However, the new Minimum Wage Act in Croatia came into force in July 2008, just before the current economic crisis broke. In a way, the Act reflected the optimism concerning the overall state of the economy of that time and was intended to provide a favourable annual adjustment of the minimum wage level by means of a regular (June) uprating of the minimum wage to average wage ratio in proportion to annual real GDP growth. Maintaining this link to GDP appears to be tricky in the current crisis, however, and the adjustment mechanisms laid down in the 2008 Act are rather ambiguous. That has resulted in varying interpretations by the social partners, with, on one side, the employers, who have begun to face difficulties in implementing a rising minimum wage to average wage ratio -due in June 2009 -without seriously affecting production and leading to substantial job losses, and on the other side, the trade unions, who are largely aware of the situation, especially crisisinduced layoffs in industry, but still not ready to renegotiate the terms of minimum wage adjustment laid down in the Act. In the middle, the Government faces a tight fiscal situation and is riot ready to commit itself to subsidies or other ways of supporting the minimum wage. As a result, annual adjustment of the minimum wage has become a problem in the context of the crisis and there is no clear policy guidance for such a situation.
Finally, the official decision on the matter was somewhat unexpected as far as most analysts (including the author) were concerned and led to only a mild increase in the minimum wage level. Accordingly, in June 2009 the minimum wage was uprated by the previous year's real GDP growth and increased by 2.4 per cent. This increase was lower than both the inflation rate and average wage growth. This means that the minimum wage level should gradually decline in real and relative terms in 2009. This "solution" has been accepted as "fair" by the employers in light of the current circumstances. The major trade union association (UATUC) has also silently accepted it and has not broached the question of minimum wage adjustment in fear of possible negative employment consequences if they insist on a higher rise. However, some trade unions believe that the official calculation is not in line with the Act and that the adjusted minimum wage level should be substantially higher. They announced that they would challenge the official decision before the Court.
In conclusion, the real minimum wage level and the minimum wage to average wage ratio in the second half of 2009 will fall below that of the second half of 2008, despite a modest nominal increase in the minimum wage level in June 2009. Workers on the minimum wage will have to accept a relative decline in their wages in the face of the increasing threat of unemployment. The minimum wage adjustment formula laid down in the 2008 Act is, therefore, experiencing severe turbulence and may not stand the test of time unless discussions take place to provide a more adequate response to the current crisis, as well as in anticipation of future challenges.
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